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ABSTRACT
Airplanes are a fast but expensive means of shipping goods, a fact which has implications for comparative
advantage. The paper develops a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods which vary by weight
and hence transport cost. Comparative advantage depends on relative air and surface transport costs
across countries and goods, as well as stochastic productivity. A key testable implication is that the
U.S. should import heavier goods from nearby countries, and lighter goods from faraway counties.
This implications is tested using detailed data on U.S. imports from 1990 to 2003. Looking across
goods the U.S. imports, nearby exporters have lower market share in goods that the rest of the world
ships by air. Looking across exporters for individual goods, distance from the US is associated with
much higher import unit values. These effects are large, which establishes that the model identifies









Countries vary in their distances from each other, and traded goods have differing physical 
characteristics. As a consequence, the cost of shipping goods varies dramatically by type of good 
and how far they are shipped. A moment’s reflection suggests that these facts are probably 
important for understanding international trade, yet they have been widely ignored by trade 
economists. In this paper I focus on one aspect of this set of facts, which is that airplanes are a 
fast but expensive means of shipping goods.  
  The fact that airplanes are fast and expensive means that they will be used for shipping 
only when timely delivery is valuable enough to outweigh the premium that must be paid for air 
shipment. They will also be used disproportionately for goods that are produced far from where 
they are sold, since the speed advantage of airplanes over surface transport is increasing in 
distance. In this paper I show how these considerations can be incorporated into the influential 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of comparative advantage. In this general model, differences 
across goods in transport costs (both air and surface) and the value that consumers place on 
timely delivery interact with relative distance to affect global trade patterns.   
  The model of the paper delivers two empirical implications that I test using highly 
disaggregated data on all U.S. imports from 1990 to 2003.  The first implication is that nearby 
trading partners (Canada and Mexico) should have lower market shares in goods that more 
distant trading partners ship primarily by air. The second implication is that goods imported from 
more distant locations will have higher unit values. Both of these implications are resoundingly 
confirmed, and the size of the effects is economically important.  In short, I find that the relative 
distance and relative transport cost effects emphasized in the model are an important influence 
on U.S. trade. Finally, I show that air shipment is much more likely for goods that have a high 
value/weight ratio.  
  There is a small, recent literature that looks at some of the issues that I analyze in this 
paper. The most direct antecedents of my paper are Limao and Venables (2002) and Hummels 
and Skiba (2004). Limao and Venables (2002) is a theory paper that models the interaction 
between specialization and trade costs, illustrating how the equilibrium pattern of specialization 
involves a tradeoff between comparative production costs and comparative transport costs. The 
geographical structure has a central location that exports a numeraire good and imports two other 
goods from more remote locations.  These more remote locations have a standard 2  2   2
production structure, and when endowments are the same at all locations and transport costs are 
the same for both goods the model reduces to one where greater distance from the center has 
simple effects on aggregate welfare: more distant countries are poorer because they face higher 
transport costs. When endowments and transport costs differ the analysis becomes more 
nuanced, with relative transport costs interacting with relative endowments to determine welfare 
and comparative advantage (for example, a relatively centrally located country that is abundant 
in the factor used intensively in the low trade cost good will have high trade volumes and high 
real GDP, while countries that are more distant, and/or that are abundant in the factor used 
intensively in the high transport cost good, will have lower trade volumes and real GDP).  This 
rich theoretical framework is not evaluated empirically in the paper, nor to my knowledge has it 
been taken to the data in subsequent work. 
  In contrast to Limao and Venables (2002), the paper by Hummels and Skiba (2004) is 
mainly empirical. Like Limao-Venables the focus is on the implications of differences in 
transport costs across goods on trade patterns, but unlike Limao-Venables (and virtually all of 
trade theory) they challenge the convenient assumption that transport costs take the iceberg form.  
Hummels-Skiba show that actual transport costs are much closer to being per-unit than iceberg, 
and they use simple price theory to show the implications for trade: imports from more distant 
locations will have disproportionately higher f.o.b. prices. This implication is strongly confirmed 
using a large dataset on bilateral product-level trade. As the model of the paper is partial 
equilibrium, Hummels-Skiba do not address the equilibrium location of production.  
  A key theoretical motivation to my analysis below is Deardorff (2004).  Deardorff works 
with a series of simple models to make a profound point about trade theory in a world of 
transport costs: “local comparative advantage” (defined as autarky prices in comparison to 
nearby countries rather than the world as a whole) is what matters in determining trade in a 
world with trade costs.  I embed this insight into the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of 
Ricardian comparative advantage in what follows. 
  A related literature is the “new economic geography”, which is well-summarized in 
Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) and Baldwin, Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano, and Robert-
Nicoud (2003).  In new economic geography models, the interaction between increasing returns 
and transport costs are a force for agglomeration, and through this channel trade costs influence 
trade patterns. The mechanism in these models is quite different from the comparative advantage   3
mechanism in Limao and Venables (2002) and Eaton and Kortum (2002).  
  David Hummels has written a series of important empirical papers that directly motivated 
this paper.  Hummels (1999) shows that ocean freight rates have not fallen on average since 
World War 2, and have often risen for substantial periods.  By contrast, the cost of air shipment 
has fallen dramatically. Chart 1 shows that these trends have continued since 1990, with the 
relative price of air shipping falling 40% between 1990 and 2004.  Hummels (2001a) shows that 
shippers are willing to pay a large premium for faster delivery, a premium that has little to do 
with the interest cost of goods in transit
1.  Hummels (2001b) analyzes the geographical 
determinants of trade costs, and decomposes the negative effect of distance on trade into 
measured and unmeasured costs.  
  The following section illustrates some key features of U.S. imports by product, trading 
partner, and transport mode from 1990 to 2003. Section 3 presents the theory, which is then 
formally tested in section 4. 
2 Airplanes and U.S. imports: a first look 
The import data used in this paper are collected by the U.S. Customs Service and reported on 
CD-ROM. For each year from 1990 to 2003, the raw data include information on the value, 
quantity (usually number or kilograms), and weight (usually in kilograms) of U.S. imports from 
all sources.  The data also include information on tariffs, transport mode and transport fees, 
including total transport charges broken down by air, vessel and (implicitly) other, plus the 
quantity of imports that come in by air, sea, and (implicitly) land.
2 The import data are reported 
at the 10-digit Harmonized System (HS) level, which is extremely detailed, with over 14,000 
codes in 2003.   
  I aggregate the 10-digit import data for analysis in various ways. For most of the 
descriptive charts and tables, I work with a broad aggregation scheme that updates Leamer’s 
(1984) classification, which is reported in Table 1.  Countries are aggregated by distance and by 
region, as described in Appendix Table A1.  Distance from the United States is measured in 
                                                 
1 By “the interest cost of goods in transit”, I mean the financial cost of having goods in transit 
before they can be sold. This opportunity cost equals the value of the good  daily interest rate  
days in transit.  
2 “other” transport modes include truck and rail, and are used exclusively on imports from 
Mexico and Canada.   4
kilometers from Chicago to the capital city of each country.
3  
  Table 1 illustrates the great heterogeneity in the prevalence of air freight for U.S. imports, 
as well as some important changes over the sample. Many products come entirely or nearly 
entirely by surface transport (oil, iron and steel, road vehicles) while others come primarily by 
air (computers, telecommunications equipment, cameras, medicine). Scanning the list of 
products and their associated air shipment shares hints at the importance of value to weight and 
the demand for timely delivery in determining shipment mode. Charts 2 and 3 illustrate the 
variation in air freight across regions and goods (the regional aggregates are defined in Appendix 
Table A1).
4 Chart 2 shows that about a quarter of US (non-oil) imports arrived by air in 2003, up 
from 20% in 1990 (for brevity, in what follows I’ll call the proportion of imports that arrive by 
air “air share”). Excluding NAFTA, the non-oil air share was 35% in 2003. Chart 3 shows that 
this average conceals great regional variation, which is related to distance: essentially no imports 
come by air from Mexico and Canada, while Europe’s air share is almost half by 2003, up from 
under 40% in 1990. East Asia’s air share increased by about half from over the sample, from 20 
to 30%.  
3 Airplanes and trade: theory 
The data reviewed in the previous section clearly suggest the influence of distance and transport 
costs on the pattern of trade.  In this section I develop a model than can be used to analyze the 
effects of transport costs on comparative advantage. 
  My basic framework comes from Eaton and Kortum (2002), simplified in some 
dimensions and made more complex in others.  On the demand side, consumers value timely 
delivery, and this valuation can differ across goods. On the supply side, timely delivery can be 
assured in two ways: by surface transport from nearby suppliers, or by air transport from faraway 
suppliers. Since air transport is expensive, it will only be used by distant suppliers, and on goods 
which have both a high demand for timely delivery and a high value/weight ratio (and thus a 
relatively small cost premium for air shipment).  
  I derive two testable empirical implications from the model.  The first implication is 
about the cross section of imported goods: nearby exporters will have a smaller market share in 
                                                 
3 A convenient source for the distance data is http://www.macalester.edu/~robertson/index.html 
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goods that faraway exporters send by air. The second implication concerns the distribution of 
unit values for a particular good: faraway exporters will sell goods which have on average have a 
higher unit value and thus lower transport costs as a share of value.  
 
3.1 Demand 
For many transactions, timely delivery is available for a substantial premium over regular 
delivery.  Why would anybody pay such a premium?  Possible answers to this question are  
analyzed in a few recent papers.  Evans and Harrigan (2005) derive the demand for timely 
delivery by retailers, who benefit from ordering from their suppliers after fickle consumer 
demand is revealed.  Evans and Harrigan show the empirical relevance of this channel using data 
on the variance of demand and the location of apparel suppliers: for goods where timely delivery 
is important, apparel suppliers to U.S. retailers are more likely to be located in Mexico, where 
timely delivery to the U.S. market is cheap, while goods where timeliness is less important are 
more likely to be located in more distant, lower-wage countries such as China.  Harrigan and 
Venables (2006) focus on the importance of the demand for timeliness as a force for 
agglomeration.  They analyze this question from a number of angles, including a model of the  
demand for  “just in time” delivery.  The logic is that more complex production processes are 
more vulnerable to disruption from faulty or delayed parts, with the result that the demand for 
timely delivery of intermediate goods is increasing in complexity of final production. 
While the details of demand and supply differ across models, the message of Evans and 
Harrigan (2005) and Harrigan and Venables (2006) is that it is uncertainty that generates a 
willingness to pay a premium for timely delivery.  For the purposes of the present paper I will 
model this result with a simple shortcut, and suppose that utility is higher for goods that are 
delivered quickly.  Looking ahead, timely delivery can be assured in one of two ways: by 
proximity between final consumers and production, or by air shipment when producers are 
located far from consumers.  The determination of the equilibrium location of producers is a 
central concern of the model. 
There is a unit continuum of goods indexed by z, with consumption denoted by x(z).  
Utility is Cobb Douglas in consumption, and the extra utility derived from timely or “fast” 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 The online appendix includes additional tables charts which show variation by product group. 
The product aggregates correspond to the headings in Table 1.   6
delivery is f(z) >1.
5  Letting F denote the set of goods that are delivered in a timely matter (for 
brevity I will call these “fast goods”), utility is given by  
   ln ln ln
zF zF
Uf z x z d z x z d z

       (1) 
Order goods so that      0, 0,1   Fz . Then the utility function can be informatively re-written 
as 
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For nominal income Y, the resulting demand functions are 





That is, all goods have the same expenditure share, regardless of whether or not they are fast.  
Denoting the prices of fast goods with a superscript f, the indirect utility function is 
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Changing the set of fast goods at the margin has the following effect on utility, 
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This inequality implies that consumers will prefer fast delivery of a good if and only if the 
marginal utility of timeliness exceeds the relative price of fast delivery.  
 
3.2  Supply: shipping mode and geography 
Atomistic producers are assumed to be perfectly competitive, which ensures that FOB price 
equals unit cost, but there is a choice of shipping mode (air or surface) and consequent CIF price 
                                                 
5 Eaton and Kortum (2002) assume CES preferences.  Since the elasticity is substitution plays no 
role in the solution of their model or mine, I use Cobb-Douglas preferences for simplicity.   7
paid.
6  Shipping costs are of the iceberg form, so that for one unit to arrive t(z) ≥ 1 units must be 
shipped.  
I now introduce distance into the model.  Denote air and surface iceberg shipping costs 
from origin country o to destination country d respectively as aod(z) and sod(z), and assume that 
aod(z) > sod(z) ≥ 1 z: air shipping is never cheaper than surface shipping. If producers are 
located near consumers, then (by assumption) they can achieve timely delivery using surface 
shipment.  If producers are located far away from consumers, then they must decide if the extra 
expense of air shipment is worthwhile. The answer is yes if consumer preference for fast delivery 
f(z) is higher than the relative cost of air shipment,      od od az sz .  Given the structure of costs 
and demand, the equilibrium shipping mode for producers located far from their customers is 




































     (2) 
By the ordering of z,  od zz   the optimal shipping mode is air and for all other goods the 
optimal mode is surface.  
  For every bilateral trade route from origin country o to destination country d,  there will 
be a cutoff  od z .  This cutoff doesn’t depend on wages or technology, only on bilateral transport 
costs.  As is traditional in trade models, I will assume that preferences, including the demand for 
timeliness schedule f(z), do not vary across countries, so that bilateral variation in transport costs 
determine which goods are shipped by surface and which by air.  
 
                                                 
6 FOB stands for “free on board”, and refers to the price of the good before transport costs are 
added. CIF stands for “cost, insurance, and freight”, and refers to the price after transport costs 
have been added.   8
3.3  Supply - competition 
The supply side of the model is based on Eaton and Kortum (2002), henceforth EK. Labor is the 
only factor of production, and is paid a wage w.  Labor productivity in good z in country o, 
 o bz , is a random variable drawn from a Fréchet distribution with parameters To > 0 and  > 1.  
As in EK, competition depends on the CIF price, but here the relevant price is timeliness-
adjusted: a country may win the market in a good by virtue of timely delivery rather than the 
lowest nominal CIF price. For each good and each bilateral route we know the optimal shipping 
decision from the discussion above, so it will be easy to specify the probability that o will win 
the competition in d.  
Let C denote the set of close country pairs, such that timely delivery is possible without 
air shipment. Define the timeliness-adjusted iceberg    od tz   as 
    
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adjusted CIF supply price   od pz   is 











Country o will win the competition to sell good z in market d if it has the lowest timeliness-
adjusted CIF price among all N countries, that is, if  
      1 min , , od d Nd p zp z p z        
As with EK, the probability that this happens is the probability that all the other prices on offer 
are greater than   od pz  . The cdf of  o b  is 
       ;P r e x p oo o Fb z Bz b T b
         
                                                                                                                                                             
7 For ease of exposition, I make the innocuous assumption that  z  is unique.   9
This reflects the assumption that all products z produced in country o have the same distribution 
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which is essentially the same as EK’s equation (5), with the only difference that this CDF differs 
by goods z, both because of variation in the demand for timeliness and variation in shipping 
costs. 
Following EK’s logic, I next derive the CDF of the price distribution in country d, which 
is the distribution of the minimum of prices offered by all potential suppliers o. This is 
     
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where the price parameter for good z in country d is defined as  
   
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 

       (4) 
Unlike in EK, this parameter varies by good, both because of the degree of timeliness 
preference and the origin-specific optimal transport mode.  Note that since   od tz   depends only 
on technological and taste parameters, the price index    d z   has the same number of 
endogenous variable in it (namely the N wages) as in EK. The probability that o captures the 

















which is similar to EK’s equation (8).  
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3.4  Equilibrium 
The final element of the model is market clearing.  Begin by considering the demand by d for o’s 
labor. For good z, the probability that d buys from o is    od z  .  The demand functions imply that 
the nominal expenditure share on good z, in CIF terms, is a constant given by    
   p zxz Y   
Thus the expected CIF expenditure by d on good z  from o is the probability that o wins the 
competition in z, times aggregate expenditure in d: 
    od od d Yz z Y    
Integrating over all goods gives d’s expenditure on goods from o as  
   
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In the EK case where timeliness is irrelevant and transport costs are the same across goods, this 
equation is identical, except that  od   is a simple function rather than an average across goods.  
As in EK, one wage can be taken as the numeraire, and solution of the model involves solving N-
1 of these equations for the N-1 remaining nominal wages. 
  Solution of the model is conceptually straightforward. The solution algorithm is 
1.  Compute all the optimal bilateral transport modes and cutoffs, which depend only on 
model parameters. 
2.  Select a numeraire wage. 









 w      o = 1,...,N-1   11
which solve for the N-1 unknown wages. The remaining endogenous variables are found by 
substitution. 
  The welfare implications of the model are summarized by the aggregate price index.  The 
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where   d p z   is the timeliness-adjusted CIF price of good z which is a Fréchet distributed 
random variable with price parameter given by (4). To evaluate the price index I replace    d p z   
by its expectation, 
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Except for a different constant , this reduces to EK’s price index when all goods z sold in d have 
the same price distribution.  
 
3.5  Trade patterns in equilibrium 
In this section, I show how relative distance affects comparative advantage.  As always, 
comparative advantage involves the interaction of country characteristics with product 
characteristics.  In my model, the relevant country characteristics are geographical location, and 
the product characteristics are timeliness-adjusted transport costs. 
Consider any two origin countries 1 and 2.  From equation (4), their relative probabilities 



















This expression emphasizes the three things that influence export success: overall productivity T, 
wages w, and timeliness-adjusted transport costs t . Only the latter varies by product for a 
particular pair of origin countries.    12
Suppose 1 and 2 are both close to d (one of them might even be d). Then using the 
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The expression is the same if both origin countries are faraway from d but the optimal shipping 
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An implication of equations (6) and (7) is that timeliness is irrelevant to export success across 
products when the optimal shipping mode is the same. 
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Comparing this expression to (6)  illustrates the mechanism in Evans and Harrigan (2005): when 
goods have a high value of timeliness, and are not shipped by air, then the market share is larger 
for the nearby country in these goods.  
Lastly,  suppose that 1 is close to d, 2 is far, and the product is shipped by air from 2.  
Then the degree of timeliness preference is irrelevant to export success, but the relative cost of 
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        ( 9 )  
To recap the above discussion, the following table summarizes the competitive environment in a 
given destination market d, from the standpoint of various potential suppliers.  The cells of the 
table indicate the optimal shipping mode: 
  Type I goods  Type II goods 
supplier near to d surface  surface 
supplier far from d surface  air 
 
For Type I goods, the nearby suppliers (including suppliers in d) have an advantage in timely 
delivery relative to faraway suppliers.  For Type II goods, all suppliers make timely delivery, but   13
nearby suppliers have a transport cost advantage because they don’t have to pay air shipping 
charges. In equilibrium, the only goods that will not be delivered in a timely matter will be those 
goods sent by surface from faraway suppliers.  These are likely to be goods where timely 
delivery is not highly valued (if timely delivery was very valuable, then the goods would 
probably be produced by the nearby supplier).  Turning to Type II goods, air shipped goods are 
likely to be ones where the cost premium for air relative to surface shipment is not too large.  
  Continue with the case where country 1 is near and country 2 is far from destination d.  
Consider two goods z
L and z
H that are “light” and “heavy” respectively in the following sense: 
  
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These inequalities imply that the light good will be shipped from 2 to d by air, and the heavy 
good will be shipped by surface. Because 1 and d are close, both goods will be shipped from 1 to 
d by surface.  Then dividing (9) by (8) gives  
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To evaluate this ratio, I make two additional innocuous assumptions.  
1.  The degree of timeliness preference    f z  is constant.  
2.  The two country’s surface shipping cost schedules are proportional, or     21 dd sz sz  .  
Using these assumptions and substituting gives   




































    (12) 
The inequality follows from the first inequality in (10), and establishes the following proposition: 
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Proposition 1  
In a given market, distant suppliers have a comparative advantage in light weight goods, 
while nearby suppliers have a comparative advantage in heavy goods. That is, faraway 
countries have a relatively high market share in goods which are shipped by air. 
 
This is the key empirically testable prediction of the model, and the intuition is straightforward. 
For heavy goods, distant producers have the double disadvantage of high shipping costs and slow 
delivery. In lightweight goods, distant producers can match the timely delivery of nearby 
suppliers by using air shipment, and their competitiveness in this range of goods depends on the 
cost of air shipment and the utility value of timely delivery.  
  Proposition 1 can be understood with the help of Figure 1.  The figure incorporates the 
additional assumption that air shipping costs increase faster with weight than do surface shipping 
costs.  An implication is that goods with higher value to weight ratios are more likely to be 
shipped by air.  This commonplace observation will be confirmed in Table 5 below.  In the 
figure, the vertical axis measures timeliness-adjusted transport costs and the horizontal index 










  is the 
faraway country’s minimized timeliness-adjusted transport cost schedule. For “light” goods 
2 zz  , goods are shipped by air from country 2, while “heavy”  2 zz   goods are shipped by 







   for all z, the nearby 
supplier always has an absolute transport cost advantage, but this cost advantage is smaller for 
goods that are shipped by air from country 2.  The Proposition follows immediately, since in the 
model comparative advantage is a monotonic function of differences in relative transport costs 
across goods. 
  These insights are further developed in a simplified three country version of the model 
(three is the smallest number of countries required for distance to affect comparative advantage) 
which is presented in the online appendix.  In the three country model, two countries are near 
each other, while the third country is more distant.  In equilibrium, the more remote country has 
lower wages, and specializes in lightweight goods which are air shipped.  Falling air transport  
costs benefit all countries, but the distant country benefits disproportionately. In addition, falling   15
air transport costs lead to greater specialization in lightweight goods by the faraway country.  
Thus in equilibrium distance matters more to specialization rather than less when some transport 
costs fall, in the sense that market shares across goods are more strongly correlated with relative 
distance. 
   
3.6 The model’s predictions for trade data 
For any given level of wages, the model delivers predictions about the cross-section of 
goods imported by a given country. It is these predictions which will be the focus of the 
empirical analysis, with the United States as the importing country.  I will focus on Proposition 
1: nearby countries will have higher market shares in heavy goods and faraway countries will 
specialize in light goods.  
  As noted in Section 2, the import data are reported at the 10-digit Harmonized System 
(HS) level, which is extremely detailed, with over 14,000 codes in 2003.  These 10-digit 
categories will be the empirical counterpart of the goods in the model in what follows. 
  The import data does not report prices, but since it reports both value and quantity I can 
calculate unit values, defined as the dollar value of imports per physical unit. Since shipping 
costs depend primarily on the physical characteristics of the good rather than on its value, low 
value goods will be “heavy” in the sense of having a higher shipping cost per unit of value
8.  For 
example, consider shoes. Quantities of shoes are reported in import data, and the units are 
“number” as in “number of shoes”. Expensive leather shoes from Italy and cheap canvas 
sneakers from China weigh about the same, but the former will have a much higher unit value. In 
the context of the model, Italian leather shoes are “lighter” than Chinese fabric sneakers, in the 
economically relevant sense that the former have lower transport costs as a share of value. It is 
important to keep in mind that it is meaningless to compare unit values when the units are not 
comparable: dollars per number of shoes is not comparable to dollars per barrel of oil or dollars 
per square meter of fabric.  
  The model’s predictions about specialization can be expressed in two ways. The first is in 
terms of relative quantities: nearby countries have a higher market share in heavy goods than 
lightweight goods.  While it would be difficult if not impossible to classify goods by weight, the 
                                                 
8 The relationship between shipping cost and shipment value is estimated by Hummels and Skiba 
(2004), Table 1. They find that shipping costs increase less than proportionately with price.     16
data does report which goods are shipped by air, so I can directly test the alternative statement of 
Proposition 1: faraway countries have a relatively high market share in goods which are shipped 
by air.  Testing this formulation of the theory will be the first empirical exercise undertaken 
below. 
  A serious objection to the above strategy is that there are many reasons unrelated to 
weight why a country might have a high market share in a particular good. For example, Canada 
has a very high market share in lumber and wood products, which have relatively low value per 
kilo and are almost never shipped by air; since Canada is adjacent to the United States this would 
seem to support the model.  But of course it would be absurd to explain trade in lumber while 
ignoring the fact that Canada is covered in trees.  
  Consequently, I conduct a second empirical exercise that focuses on the model’s 
predictions about unit values of goods which are actually imported. For a particular group of 
goods, the model predicts a relationship between unit values and distance: imports from nearby 
countries should have lower unit values than imports from more distant countries. That is, the 
deviation of unit values from the group mean should be positively related to distance from the 
U.S.  
  To state this a bit more formally, suppose that a given HS code contains goods of varying 
weights, which we can order from lightest to heaviest. According to the model, each good within 
the HS code will be provided by one country, with the winner of the good-by-good competition 
being stochastic. Thus, a country that exports in this code must have won at least one 
competition. Conditional on exporting in this code, nearby countries are more likely to have won 
competitions among the heavier goods, and more distant countries are likely to have won in the 
lighter goods.  
  Note that this formulation of the model’s prediction effectively controls for other, non-
weight related determinants of specialization (the “Canadian trees” problem). This is because the 
prediction about the cross-section of unit values within an HS code is conditional on countries 
exporting in that category at all.  
 
4 Airplanes and trade: empirical evidence 
The trade data that was described in section 2 above will now be used to test the theory laid out 
in section 3. In addition to data on imports and distance, I also use data on macro variables such   17
as real GDP per capita and aggregate price level, which come from the Penn World tables.
9  
4.1 Statistical results: market shares 
The first empirical exercise is focused on the prediction that exporters that are far from the 
United States will have a relatively high market share of U.S. imports in goods which are 
shipped by air.  The geography of North America suggests an obvious empirical definition of 
“near” and “far”: Mexico and Canada are near the United States, while all other exporters are far. 
Thus, the prediction becomes 
Mexico and Canada will have lower shares of U.S. imports in products which the rest of 
the world ships by air. 
As a preliminary to the statistical model, Plot 1 illustrates the relationship between the Mexico-
Canada market and the share of non-NAFTA imports that arrive by air (“air share”), for 2003. 
There is a clear negative relationship: when the non-NAFTA air share is low, the NAFTA market 
share is on average higher than when the non-NAFTA air share is high.  This is exactly what the 
theory predicts. 








i    = Faraway exporters’ aggregate share of the U.S. import market of product i 
  ai   = share of product i imports that arrive by air from exporters other than Canada 
and Mexico 
The prediction of the model is 1 > 0. The results are reported in Table 2. 
  The following issues in estimating equation (13) are important: 
1.  measurement of ai: In the data, a given good from a given exporter is almost invariably 
shipped entirely by air or entirely by surface. Aggregating across all faraway exporters 
(which is how ai is constructed) introduces some heterogeneity, but about half of all 
goods have an air share of either zero or one. To account for this, I report two 
specifications. The first treats ai as a continuous variable.  The second creates two 
indicators for ai = 1 and ai = 0 respectively. 
                                                 
9 The Penn World table data are available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php   18
2.  omitted variables: In addition to being near the U.S., Canada and Mexico also belong to 
NAFTA starting in 1994, which means they have a tariff preference compared to faraway 
countries which differs across products and which may be correlated with ai. To control 
for this I include the average tariff for faraway countries (which is equivalent to the 
Canada-Mexico tariff preference) in all regressions, though to save space I do not report 
the coefficients.  Unreported results show that excluding tariffs from the regressions has 
no effect on the parameter of interest. 
3.  estimation sample: Pooling across all products and exporting countries may obscure 
important variation in 1. To account for this issue I estimate the model on various sub-
samples in addition to the full sample. First, I break products down into manufacturing 
products (SITC 6 manufactured goods, SITC 7 machinery and transport equipment, and 
SITC 8 miscellaneous manufactures) and nonmanufacturing products.  Second, I pool 
only high-income exporters (defined by the World Bank classification in each year), so 
that 1 is identified by the market share difference between Canada and all other high-
income exporters. Finally, I pool only middle-income exporters, so that 1 is identified by 
the market share difference between Mexico and all other middle-income exporters. 
4.  error structure: Since market shares by construction are between zero and one, the OLS 
assumption that the error term has infinite range is not valid, and OLS fitted values may 
lie outside the unit interval.  To control for this, Table 2 reports results from a double-
sided Tobit specification which ensures that all fitted values lie in the unit interval.  All 
covariance matrices are computed using the heteroskedastic-robust White estimator. 
  Table 2 reports many numbers, but the key message is told by the numbers highlighted in 
bold, which report estimates of the airshare effect in 2003. I focus my discussion here on the 
Tobit specification of Table 2, though it should be noted that the estimated effects are somewhat 
smaller in the (simpler but mis-specified) OLS specification reported Table A4 in the online 
appendix. 
  The top row of Table 2 shows that in 2003, for the full sample the coefficient on airshare 
was 0.09.  The interpretation is that in moving from goods which were completely shipped by 
surface to those completely sent by air, the average market share of faraway exporters went up 
by 9 percentage points.  The specification that looks just at the extremes of ai implies an effect of 
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14 percentage points: goods shipped solely by air had an average 13.4 percentage point higher 
market share relative to Mexico and Canada than goods shipped entirely by surface. These are 
economically big effects.  The rest of Table 2 shows that the effect is strongest for high-income 
exporters of manufactured products: compared to Canada, other rich exporters of air shipped 
manufactured products have a 22.9 percentage point higher market share in goods sent by air 
compared to goods sent by surface (central panel of table, second bolded column).  By contrast, 
the effect is not statistically significant from zero for middle income exporters of non-
manufactured products (last panel of table, last bolded column); the effect for high-income 
exporters of non-manufactured goods is 0.101, about the same as the overall effect.  
  In summary, Table 2 shows that the interaction of distance and transport mode has an 
important influence on the source of U.S. imports, at least for high-income exporters (The effect 
is weak or non-existent for middle income exporters).  The effect is strongest in manufactured 
goods shipped by high-income exporters, which were more than 40 percent of U.S. imports in 
2003. This is striking evidence in support of Proposition 1:  in both the model and the data, 
faraway countries have a relatively high market share in goods which are shipped by air. 
 
4.2 Statistical results: unit values 
In this section I focus on what the model predicts about the price of imports across source 
countries: imports from faraway countries will have higher f.o.b. unit values than goods shipped 
from nearby countries. Statistically, I investigate this by looking at variation in unit values across 
exporters within 10-digit HS categories. The econometric model I use is 
  ic i c ic v d other controls              ( 1 4 )  
where  
vic = log unit value of imports of product i from country c  
i = fixed effect for 10-digit HS code i 
  dc = distance of c from United States 
Note that import values are measured f.o.b, so they do not include transport charges. The model 
predicts  > 0 in equation (14): across exporters within a 10-digit commodity category, more 
distant exporters will sell products with higher unit values, controlling for other observable 
country-specific factors which might affect unit values. When the units are kilograms, then the 
prediction for unit values is a prediction about the value-weight ratio.    20
  The fact that equation (14) uses only cross-exporter variation within each 10-digit HS 
differentiates it from equation (13).  The advantage of using a within-product estimator is that it 
controls for which goods a country exports: if a country does not export product i to the US, then 
that country’s distance from the US is (appropriately) irrelevant to the effect of distance on unit 
values within product i. Product fixed effects also control for differences in physical 
characteristics of products, making it possible to meaningfully pool information from microchips 
and potato chips. 
  The basic measurement of distance is distance in kilometers between the US and the 
exporting countries. The model, and common sense, give no reason to expect that any distance 
effect is linear, so I adopt a piecewise formulation which allows for, but does not impose, an 
approximately linear distance effect. Thus I measure distance by five indicator variables, based 
on grouping countries into similar distances from the US:  
1.  adjacent to the US (Mexico and Canada). 
2.  between 1 and 4,000 kilometers (Caribbean islands and the northern coast of South 
America). 
3.   between 4,000km and 7,800km (Europe west of Russia, most of South America, a few 
countries on the West Coast of Africa) 
4.  between 7,800km and 14,000km (most of Asia and Africa, the Middle East, and, 
Argentina/Chile) 
5.  over 14,000km (Australia/New Zealand, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia/Singapore) 
In some of the regressions, I aggregate the distance classes into near (less than 4,000km ) and far. 
I also include a dummy for if a country is landlocked.  
There are other factors that could affect unit values within 10-digit products, and I control for 
some of these. Other controls include  
1.  tariffs, measured as ad valorem percentage, which should have a negative sign to the extent 
that trade costs are borne by producers. 
2.  macro indicator of comparative advantage (log aggregate real GDP per worker, from the 
Penn-World Tables). My model is silent on how these aggregate measures might affect 
prices, but if more advanced countries specialize in more advanced and/or higher quality 
goods, we would expect positive effects of these variables on log unit values. Evidence of 
such effects is reported by Schott (2004), Hallak (2006) and Hummels and Klenow (2005).   21
  Before turning to estimation of equation (14), it is informative to look at a plot of the 
data.  Plot 2 shows the distribution of log U.S. import unit values from two groups of exporters: 
the NAFTA countries Canada and Mexico, and exporters whose goods cross the Atlantic or 
Pacific Ocean. I first remove the HS10 mean log unit values, so that the plot shows deviations 
from product-specific averages.  There are two key features visible in Plot 2.  The first is that the 
distribution for remote exporters is clearly shifted to the right relative to the distribution for 
Canada and Mexico: as predicted by the model, goods have higher unit values when they travel a 
greater distance.  The second notable feature of the data is the extremely wide scale of the 
horizontal axis, from -4 to +4 (a few even more extreme values are trimmed in the interests of 
readability).  This great range of log unit values is suggestive of substantial heterogeneity even 
within narrowly-defined HS10 categories.  
  Tables 3 and 4 report the results of estimating equation (14)
10. For each year, log unit 
value is regressed on the controls as well as fixed effects for 10-digit HS codes. In the interest of 
reducing the quantity of numbers presented, I report results for only four selected years (1990, 
1995, 2000, and 2003), although all regressions were estimated on all 14 years from 1990 to 
2003 (complete results available on request). Each column shows results for a single year’s 
regression, with t-statistics in italics.  
The specifications in Tables 3 and 4 differ in the definition of the dependent variable. 
Table 3 uses the broadest definition of unit value, and includes all observations for which units 
are reported, whether those units are number, barrels, dozens, kilos, or something else. Table 4 
includes only observations for which weight in kilos is reported, so the unit value in the Table 4 
is precisely the value-weight ratio for all of the observations.  
Tables 3 and 4 include all available observations, while Appendix Tables A4 and A5 
restrict the sample in two ways. First, very small and potentially erratic observations are 
eliminated by dropping all import records of less than $10,000. Second, to focus attention on 
manufactured goods, Tables A4 and A5 include only HS codes that belong to SITC 6, 7, and 8.  
Tables 3 and 4 show that the effect of distance on unit values is large, robust, and 
statistically significant. The first column for each year in Tables 3 and 4 has a single indicator for 
                                                 
10 All regressions are estimated by OLS, with product fixed effects and robust standard errors. 
Note that standard errors are not adjusted for clustering by exporting country, despite the fact   22
distance greater than 4000km from the United States. As the first row of Table 3 shows, for the 
full sample unit values are around 30 log points higher when they come from more distant 
locations. The effect is even larger when the sample is restricted to observations with units in 
kilos, with the distance effect between 40 and 50 log points (first row, Table 4).  
The second four rows of Tables 3 and 4 break down distance into a larger number of 
categories, with Mexico/Canada as the excluded category. A striking feature of these results is 
the non-monotonic effect of distance.  For example, in Table 3 in 2003 the closest non-adjacent 
distance category is associated with unit values 15.9 log points higher than Mexico/Canada, an 
effect which jumps to 52 log points for the next category, before falling back to 10.4 and 16.8 
log points in the final two distance categories.  The pattern is similar in Table 4, but the effects 
are substantially larger.  The additional effect of being landlocked is also large, ranging between 
18 and 55 log points across specifications in Tables 3 and 4  
The estimated effects of distance are invariably larger in Table 4 than in Table 3. This 
discrepancy is supportive of the model’s predictions, since the dependent variable in Table 4 (log 
value/kilo), is more closely connected to the theory than the dependent variable in Table 3 (log 
unit value). To the extent that different units within a product have different weights (which they 
often do), one would expect a weaker connection between unit value and distance.  
The puzzling non-monotonicity of the distance effect on unit values probably reflects 
imperfectly measured country characteristics that affect unit values and are correlated with 
distance, since the 4000-7800 range includes many of the most developed countries (including 
all of the EU exporters). The importance of development in affecting unit values was found in 
Schott (2004), Hallak (2006) and Hummels and Klenow (2005), and is confirmed here: a higher 
aggregate productivity level  raises unit values with a large and significant elasticity, between 0.4 
and 0.55, in every regression in Tables 4 and 5.  The very large effect of the 4000-7800km 
category on unit values is suggestive of a non-linear effect of log GDP on unit values, and/or 
some other feature of the EU countries that leads them to specialize in high unit value products 
within HS codes.  The fact that distance is correlated with GDP per capita is a fundamental 
feature of the data, and in the context of a within-product data specification like equation (14) it 
is not possible to more precisely isolate the separate effects of distance and development on unit 
                                                                                                                                                             
that cross-product correlation of errors within an exporter is a priori plausible. For an 
explanation, see the Online Appendix.   23
values. 
Although the tariff effects are not the focus of the paper, it is interesting that they are 
consistently estimated to be small (between -0.013 and -0.002), negative and statistically 
significant. These negative effects are consistent with the US being a large market for most 
exporters, and are suggestive of a small terms of trade gain from protection. 
 Appendix Tables A4 and A5 repeat the specifications of Tables 3 and 4 for a narrower 
sample, excluding non-manufacturing imports as well as very small observations (value of less 
than $10,000). The results are largely consistent with Tables 3 and 4, which confirms that the 
overall results are not driven by a small number of observations or by non-manufacturing SITC 
categories.  
 
4.3 Statistical results: the shipping mode choice 
  A final empirical question concerns the choice between air and surface shipment by 
remote exporters.  According to the model, the mechanism behind the within-product 
specialization documented in Tables 3 and 4 is that remote exporters are more likely to ship 
goods by air, and that these goods are “light” in the economically relevant sense of having low 
air transport costs as a share of value.  Since transport charges per unit are more closely related 
to weight than value (as common observation as well and Hummels and Skiba (2004) show), 
transport charges as a share of value are declining in a goods value/weight ratio.  Therefore, 
according to the model air shipment should be the mode of choice only for high value/weight (or 
“light”) products from distant locations.  In this section I test this prediction. 
  The implication of the model that nearby countries will not choose air shipment is 
confirmed by Chart 3: virtually all U.S. imports from Canada and Mexico come by surface 
transport.  A challenge in testing the theory that air shipment is chosen for high value/weight 
goods is the endogeneity between value and shipment mode: the theory says that consumers are 
willing to pay a premium for air shipped goods, which is why suppliers (sometimes) choose air 
shipment.  Thus, I need an instrument for a product’s value/weight: a variable that is correlated 
with value/weight but unrelated to shipment choice.  The fact that Canada and Mexico don’t use 
air shipment suggests a potentially powerful instrument, which is value/weight of imports from 
Mexico and Canada. For a given HS10 code i and a given non-NAFTA exporter c, the   24
value/weight of Mexican-Canadian good i is likely to be correlated with value/weight of good i 
from c, but should have no independent effect on the shipping mode choice from c.
11  
  To test the mechanism that remote exporters are more likely to ship high value/weight 
goods by air, I estimate a discrete choice model of the shipping mode choices of all exporters 
except NAFTA. Defining the indicator variable aic = 1 if product i is shipped by air from 
exporter c, I estimate the following probit model for each year:    
   01 2 Pr 1| ic ic c ic a data p       β x          ( 1 5 )  
where pic is the log value per kilo of imports of product i from country c, xc is a vector of country 
characteristics including distance indicators and log aggregate productivity, and  ic   is normally 
distributed.  
  The air shipment indicator aic is coded as 1 if the share of imports sent by air for that 
product-country is greater than 0.9, and aic is coded as 0 is the share is less than 0.1. The 
estimation sample is substantially smaller than in the previous section because the following 
observations are excluded:   
1.  imports from NAFTA 
2.  products where weight in kilos is not reported 
3.  products not exported by NAFTA (needed for instrument) 
4.  products with non-trivial share of NAFTA imports arriving by air (very few products) 
5.  Observations where share of goods that arrive by air is between 0.1 and 0.9. 
  The estimator is maximum likelihood, with pic instrumented by the average value of pi 
from Mexico and Canada. This is a strong instrument, with a simple correlation of around 0.6 
between the instrument and pic.  The estimated covariance matrix allows for heteroskedasticity 
and clustering by country.
12 Distance is measured using the same categories as in the previous 
section, but since NAFTA observations are excluded from the estimation, the excluded dummy 
variable becomes the distance category of 1-4000 kilometers. Results are reported in Table 5.  
  Looking at the bottom two rows of the table first, the instrument appears valid: the null 
that there is no correlation in the first stage is rejected, while the null that the instrument can be 
excluded in the second stage can not be rejected. Turning to the marginal effects, there is strong 
                                                 
11 For brevity, I will sometimes use “NAFTA” as a synonym for “Mexico and/or Canada”, 
although the NAFTA agreement was not in force in the early years of my sample. 
12 See appendix for an important caveat about estimation of the covariance matrix.   25
evidence that higher value/weight goods are more likely to be shipped by air: a one percent 
increase in value/weight leads to about a 0.2 percentage point increase in the probability of air 
shipment.  Given the huge range in value/weight
13, this is a very large effect, and it is tightly 
estimated. By contrast, the other explanatory variables (distance, landlocked, and aggregate 
productivity) do not have statistically significant effects, especially in the later years.   
 
4.4 Summarizing the evidence 
  Applying Proposition 1 to the United States, the model of Section 2 predicts that more 
distant exporters to the U.S. will specialize in light-weight goods which are shipped by air.  The 
empirical analysis evaluated this prediction in three ways: by looking at market shares of 
different goods, within-product variation in unit values across exporters, and the determinants of 
shipping mode. 
  In section 4.2, I showed that Canada and Mexico have market shares that are on average 
about 9 percentage points higher in goods that other countries do not ship by air.  This aggregate 
effect is mainly driven by the difference between Canada and other high-income exporters, 
especially in manufactured goods, where the effect is around 20 percentage points. These results 
are reported in Table 2. 
  In section 4.3, I focused on within-category variation in import unit values.  Thus the 
statistical model of equation (14) asks the question: if a country exports a good to the US, is the 
unit value of that good related to distance?  The answer is yes, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.  If we 
focus on the final year of the sample, we find that exports that arrive from destinations more than 
4000km from the U.S. (that is, from sources other than Mexico, Canada, and the Caribbean) have 
import unit values between 25 and 40 log points higher than those from nearby sources.     
  A puzzling finding is that the effect of distance on unit values is non-monotonic, with the 
effect seemingly peaking in the distance range of 4000-7800km. Since this distance category 
includes Europe, the large estimated coefficients may be conflating the effect of distance and 
Europe’s comparative advantage in producing high-quality goods.  This is an important caveat 
for interpreting the size of the distance effect but does not overturn the strong relationship 
between distance and import unit value. 
                                                 
13 In 2003, the 5th-95th percentile range of log value/weight is [-0.2,5], which is a factor of more 
than 120 in levels.   26
  The results of Tables 3 and 4 confirm the importance of distance for unit values, but they 
don’t say anything about the role of shipment mode choice.  Table 5 fills in this gap, with the 
unsurprising finding that air shipment is strongly related to value/weight. Thus, we can conclude 
that the findings of Tables 3 and 4 are driven at least in part by the mechanism studied in the 
model: remote exporters specialize in lightweight goods which are shipped by air. 
  Lastly, the results confirm the results of Schott (2004), Hallak (2006), and Hummels-
Klenow (2005) that there is an important relationship between import unit values and the level of 
development, which probably reflects a comparative advantage that rich countries have in high-
quality goods.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the interaction between trade, distance, transport costs, and the choice 
of shipping mode. In the theory model, I showed how the existence of airplanes implies that 
countries that are far from their major export markets will have a comparative advantage in 
lightweight goods. This prediction is strongly supported by the data. 
  In the empirical sections, I documented the heterogeneity across regions and goods of the 
prevalence of air shipment in US imports. The statistical analysis finds three strong and robust 
empirical relationships that support the model. The first is that Canada and Mexico have much 
higher market shares in goods which other countries do not ship by air.  The second is that U.S. 
imports from remote suppliers have unit values on the order of a third higher than those from 
nearby countries. The third (and least surprising) result is that the probability of air shipment is 
strongly related to distance and unit value.  
  Distance is not dead, and the theory and empirical results of this paper suggest that it will 
not be expiring any time soon.  The fall in the relative cost of air shipment implies that relative 
distance may become even more important in determining comparative advantage, as nearby 
countries increasingly trade heavy goods with each other while trading lighter goods with their 
more distant trading partners.  
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Figure 1 - Transport costs for nearby and faraway  
sellers in a given market 
 
 
Notes to Figure 1: Goods are ordered from lightest to heaviest, so that all transport costs are 










  is the faraway country’s 
minimized timeliness-adjusted transport cost schedule. For “light” goods  2 zz  , goods are 
shipped by air from country 2, while “heavy” goods are shipped by surface regardless of which 
country sells them.  
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Notes to Chart 1: Data are price indices for U.S. imports of air freight and ocean liner shipping 
services from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/mxp. The “Air/Ocean” series divides 
all US imports of air freight services by all imports of ocean liner services, while the “Air Asia / 
Ocean Pacific” series divides the index for air freight imports from Asia by the index for ocean 
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Table 1 Imports by product and percent air shipped, 1990 and 2003 
Share of 
total 



















12.2 8.9  Petroleum         
     33  100.0  2.4  100.0  2.9  Petroleum,  petroleum products and related materials 
2.2  3.3  Other fuel & raw materials   
      28  35.0  9.1  7.5  13.6  Metalliferous ores and metal scrap 
      34  30.6  1.4  74.3  7.6  Gas, natural and manufactured 
     23  11.2  6.8 4.5 10.0  Crude  rubber 
     27  10.6  19.4  5.7  19.6  Crude  fertilizers and crude minerals  
      26  5.5  7.7  1.6  29.1  Textile fibres  
     35  4.3 0.0 3.4 0.0  Electric  current 
      32  2.7  1.7  2.9  0.3  Coal, coke and briquettes 
3.4 2.8  Forest  products       
     64  51.2  23.8  43.5  19.5  Paper,  paperboard and articles thereof 
      24  18.9  4.9  21.2  4.0  Cork and wood 
      25  17.3  12.3  7.6  9.5  Pulp and waste paper 
      63  12.6  18.3  27.7  13.0  Cork and wood manufactures (excluding furniture) 
5.7  4.7  Animal and vegetable products 
      05  19.8  7.4  19.5  5.8  Vegetables and fruit 
     03  18.5  31.2  17.4  26.6  Fish,  crustaceans, molluscs and aquatic invertebrates 
     11  12.7  4.7  17.9  2.7  Beverages 
      07  12.0  6.2  9.0  8.2  Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 
     01  10.5  15.0  7.6  14.7  Meat and meat preparations 
     29  4.4  36.8  4.8  40.6  Crude  animal  and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 
     06  4.3 3.0 3.7 3.9  Sugars, sugar preparations and honey 
     0  4.3  86.6  2.8  83.8  Live  animals  other than animals of division 03 
     04  3.2 5.6 5.6 4.0  Cereals and cereal preparations 
     12  2.3  16.2  2.2  14.1  Tobacco and tobacco manufactures   33
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      42  2.3  3.7  2.3  6.6  Fixed vegetable fats and oils, crude, refined or fractionated 
      02  1.7  18.9  1.9  14.2  Dairy products and birds' eggs 
     09  1.4 6.9 3.2 7.9  Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 
     08  1.2 9.6 1.2 5.2  Feeding  stuff  for  animals (not including unmilled cereals) 
     22  0.7  11.8  0.5  10.8  Oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits 
      21  0.6  44.2  0.2  61.1  Hides, skins and furskins, raw 
     43  0.2 3.1 0.3  10.3  Animal or vegetable fats and oils 
     41  0.1  13.4  0.1  18.7  Animal oils and fats 
15.3  15.9  Labor intensive manufactures 
     84 33.3 56.5  31.4  47.5  Articles  of  apparel and clothing accessories 
     89  32.9  47.0  32.6 46.4  Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s. 
     85  12.8  46.3  7.7 50.1  Footwear 
     66  11.6  28.9  13.7 24.5  Non-metallic mineral manufactures, n.e.s. 
     82  6.6  12.8  12.2 12.3  Furniture, and parts thereof  
     83  2.9  60.9  2.3 58.2  Travel  goods, handbags and similar containers 
8.1  7.0  Capital intensive manufactures 
      67  24.5  3.3  14.5  7.1  Iron and steel 
     68  23.4  17.0  19.4 25.2  Non-ferrous  metals 
     69  22.2  24.2  28.5 29.4  Manufactures of metals, n.e.s. 
     65  15.8  45.8  19.7 46.3  Textile  yarn, fabrics, made-up articles, n.e.s 
     62  8.7  14.6  9.7 27.0  Rubber manufactures, n.e.s. 
     81  3.1  18.4  6.9 20.0  Prefabricated buildings, lighting & plumbing fixtures 
      61  2.2  59.1  1.3  65.3  Leather, leather manufactures, n.e.s., and dressed furskins 
45.2 45.0  Machinery         
      78  34.2  14.7  31.1  19.4  Road vehicles (including air-cushion vehicles) 
     77  15.0  55.3  14.6 60.9  Electrical  machinery, apparatus and appliances, n.e.s., and parts  
     75  12.3  73.6  14.5 74.5  Office  machines  and automatic data-processing machines 
      76  9.7  57.6  12.7  74.5  Telecommunications and sound-recording/reproducing apparatus  
     74  6.4  31.5  6.8 34.7  General industrial machinery and equipment and parts, n.e.s. 
     72  5.9  30.2  3.7 35.7  Machinery  specialized for particular industries 
     71  5.8  40.1  5.7 43.9  Power-generating machinery and equipment   34
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     79  3.3  42.0  3.6 42.8  Other transport equipment 
     88  3.0  68.2  2.1 73.7  Photographic apparatus, optical goods, watches 
     87  2.7  64.0  4.2 75.5  Professional, scientific and controlling instruments, n.e.s. 
     73  1.7  28.9  1.0 41.4  Metalworking  machinery 
4.5 8.3  Chemical
s 
      
     51  32.7  23.4  33.5 32.2  Organic  chemicals 
     52  14.0  11.1  7.1 16.8  Inorganic  chemicals 
     54  11.7  54.6  31.2 65.0  Medicinal and pharmaceutical products 
     59  9.2  10.9  6.7 21.6  Chemical  materials and products, n.e.s. 
     57  8.9  7.2 7.1 19.5  Plastics in primary forms 
     58  8.0  24.2  4.6 27.2  Plastics in non-primary forms 
     53  5.9  10.4  2.4 18.4  Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials 
     55  5.3  28.3  5.4 22.7  Essential  oils  and resinoids and perfume; cleanser 
     56  4.2  8.7 2.0  6.9  Fertilizers  (other than those of group 272)   35
 
Plot 1 - NAFTA share of U.S. imports vs. non-NAFTA air shipment share, 2003 
 
 
Notes to Plot 1 Each point corresponds to an HS10 product, and shows the share of total imports 
of that product that comes from Canada and Mexico plotted against the share of non-NAFTA 
imports of that product that arrives by air. Circle sizes are proportional to the square root of total 
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Table 2  Tobit market share regressions 
 
    all exporters  high income exporters  middle income exporters 
  1990 1995 2000 2003 1990 1995 2000 2003 1990 1995 2000 2003 
all products, continuous air share 
0.091 0.076 0.082 0.090  0.105 0.112 0.134 0.166  -0.093 -0.083 -0.123 -0.096 air share 
8.3 7.1 8.0 8.6  9.5 10.7  13.0  15.6  -3.7 -4.2 -6.8 -5.3 
all products, binary air share indicator 
0.002 -0.001 0.016 -0.002 -0.012 -0.017 -0.010 -0.032 0.189  0.181  0.194  0.184 
air share = 0 
0.2 -0.1 2.1 -0.3 -1.5 -1.9 -1.1 -3.4 11.7  14.8  17.5  17.5 
0.157 0.081 0.130 0.132 0.145 0.103 0.150 0.172 0.204 0.181 0.180 0.218 
air share = 1 
7.9 4.5 7.3 7.1 7.4 5.9 9.1  10.3  5.6 6.3 6.3 7.3 
0.155 0.082 0.114 0.134  0.157 0.120 0.160 0.204  0.015 -0.000 -0.014 0.034  (air share = 1) - 
(air share = 0)  7.5 4.4 6.1 7.0  7.7 6.3 8.9  11.0  0.4 -0.0 -0.5 1.1 
sample size  12,537 13,659 14,469 14,783 12,005 12,918 13,622 13,701  7,093  8,829  10,572 11,614 
manufacturing products, continuous air share 
0.129 0.111 0.110 0.110 0.133 0.134 0.154  0.181 -0.052 -0.044 -0.081 -0.059 air share  12.1 10.3 10.4  10.2 12.7 12.2 14.5  16.7 -1.9 -2.0 -4.1  -3.1
manufacturing products, binary air share indicator 
-0.016 -0.020 0.014 -0.009 -0.032 -0.037 -0.018 -0.036 0.151  0.134  0.160  0.159 
air share = 0 
-1.9 -2.2 1.7 -1.0 -3.6 -3.6 -1.7 -3.2 8.6 10.2  13.2  13.9 
0.232 0.138 0.155 0.165 0.205 0.135 0.155 0.193 0.198 0.165 0.168 0.228 
air share = 1 
11.2 7.2  8.3  8.2 10.5 7.4  9.2 11.2 4.9 5.2 5.4 6.8 
0.248 0.157 0.141 0.173  0.237 0.172 0.173 0.229  0.046 0.031 0.008 0.070  (air share = 1) - 
(air share = 0)  11.4 7.7  7.1 8.2  11.3 8.8  9.1 11.5  1.2 0.9 0.3 2.0 
sample size  9,042  9,783 10,453  10,610 8,838  9,495 10,104  10,120  5,335 6,557 7,852 8,526 
non-manufacturing products 
-0.065 -0.033 -0.022 0.016  -0.026 0.044 0.046 0.101  -0.160 -0.116 -0.133 -0.125 air share 
-2.0 -1.1 -0.8 0.6  -0.8 1.3 1.4 3.1  -2.6 -2.1 -2.6 -2.5 
non-manufacturing products, binary air indicator 
0.04  0.011 0.015 0.008 0.040 0.004 0.015 -0.019 0.230 0.218 0.136 0.157 
air share = 0 
2.3 0.6 0.9 0.5 1.9 0.2 0.8 -0.9 4.9 5.5 4.1 5.1 
-0.060 -0.099 0.020  0.028 -0.039 -0.037 0.100 0.085 0.184 0.164 0.116 0.102 
air share = 1 
-1.3 -2.4 0.5  0.7 -0.8 -0.8 2.2 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.6 1.4 
-0.102 -0.109 0.005 0.020  -0.079 -0.042 0.085 0.104  -0.046 -0.054 -0.020 -0.055 (air share = 1) - 
(air share = 0)  -2.3 -2.7 0.1 0.5  -1.7 -0.9 1.9 2.4  -0.6 -0.8 -0.3 -0.8 
sample size  3,495 3,876 4,016 4,173 3,167 3,423 3,518 3,581 1,758 2,272 2,720 3,088 
   37
Notes to Table 2: Estimation of equation (13) in the text. Dependent variable is aggregate market 
share in U.S. imports of exporters other than Canada and Mexico. Unit of observation is an HS 
10 code.  Robust t-statistics are in italics.  
  For each sample, two specifications are estimated: with a continuous measure of air 
share, and with two indicators for air share = 0 and 1.  In this second specification, the Tables 
report the point estimate and t-statistic on the difference between the coefficients on the 
indicators.  Estimator is double sided Tobit, with upper and lower censoring of 1 and 0 
respectively. The most interesting numbers in the Tables are rendered in bold.    38
 




Notes to Plot 2 Kernel densities of log import unit values, expressed as deviations from HS10 
means.  Density labeled NAFTA is all log unit values from Canada and Mexico, density labeled 
“remote exporters” includes observations from exporters more than 4000 km from the United 
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Table 3 - Regression of U.S. import unit values on distance and other controls,  
all available observations 
 
  1990 1995  2000  2003 
0.319   0.377 0.317 0.323  more than 
4000km  26.9    30.7 26.8 28.0 
 -0.020  0.078 0.231   0.159
1-4000km 
  -1.0  3.9 11.4   8.0
 0.551  0.646 0.495   0.520 4000-
7800km    38.6  46.7 38.2   39.9
 0.043  0.124 0.159   0.104 7800-
14,000km    2.8  8.1 10.7   7.0
 0.138  0.172 0.203   0.168 more than 
14,000km    7.1  9.3 11.4   9.7
0.510  0.365 0.508 0.363 0.498 0.395 0.546 0.415
log Y/L 
78.4  60.2 87.1 63.5 90.3 67.2 103.8 74.4
0.388  0.236 0.556 0.373 0.406 0.300 0.499 0.360
landlocked 
17.9 10.7  26.1 17.4 21.0 15.3 24.9  17.7
-0.013 -0.012  -0.010 -0.011 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.005
tariff 
-4.5  -4.6 -7.8 -8.9 -1.8 -2.4 -6.7 -5.3
R
2 within  0.113  0.142 0.107 0.137 0.102 0.114 0.120 0.136
N  88,984 108,837  121,830  127,602 
HS codes  11,815 13,131  13,788  14,103 
 
Notes to Table 3: Estimates of equation (14) in the text. For each year, log U.S. import unit 
value is regressed on indicators for exporter distance from the US, other controls, and fixed 
effects for 10 digit HS codes. Estimation is by OLS, t-statistics clustered by HS code are in 
italics. Y/L is aggregate real GDP per worker of the exporter, landlocked is an indicator for the 
exporter having no port, and tariff is ad valorem percentage. N is sample size, “HS codes” is the 
number of 10 digit HS code fixed effects,  and “R
2 within” is the R
2 after removing HS10 means 
from the data. 
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Table 4 - Regression of U.S. import value/kilo on distance and other controls,  
all available observations 
 
  1990 1995  2000  2003 
0.408   0.520 0.474 0.454  more than 
4000km  35.9   41.3 39.6 39.1 
 0.203  0.283 0.315   0.278
1-4000km 
  10.7 16.0 17.8   15.6
 0.609  0.741 0.620   0.636 4000-
7800km    44.0 52.4 45.4   48.0
 0.347  0.465 0.465   0.358 7800-
14,000km    23.1 31.0 31.1   23.4
 0.304  0.423 0.423   0.354 more than 
14,000km    16.1 23.5 23.7   20.0
0.432 0.367 0.450 0.381 0.440 0.397 0.505  0.422
log Y/L 
67.7 58.3 77.1 63.7 82.1 67.0 97.0  73.3
0.436 0.352 0.543 0.444 0.464 0.412 0.554  0.461
landlocked 
18.1 14.5 23.9 19.5 22.7 20.0 27.9  73.3
-0.011 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
tariff 
-8.7 -10.7  -6.5 -7.7 -3.5 -4.6 -6.7  -6.0
R
2 within  0.164 0.183 0.167 0.186 0.156 0.162 0.181  0.225
N  52,028 66,366  74,271  78,910 
HS codes  7,422 8,518  8,910  9,139 
 
Notes to Table 4: Estimates of equation (14) in the text. For each year, log U.S. import 
value/kilo is regressed on indicators for exporter distance from the US, other controls, and fixed 
effects for 10 digit HS codes. Estimation is by OLS, t-statistics clustered by HS code are in 
italics. Y/L is aggregate real GDP per worker of the exporter, landlocked is an indicator for the 
exporter having no port, tariff is ad valorem percentage. N is sample size, “HS codes” is the 
number of 10 digit HS code fixed effects,  and “R
2 within” is the R
2 after removing HS10 means 
from the data. 
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Table 5 – Probit of shipment mode choice by non-NAFTA exporters 
 
  1990 1995 2000 2003 
0.182 0.202 0.234 0.221  log value/kilo  10.9 13.3 17.5 16.3 
-0.068 -0.001 0.151  0.078  4000-7800km  -1.4 0.0 1.9 1.0 
-0.181 -0.156 -0.054 -0.074  7800-
14,000km  -5.6 -3.5 -0.7 -1.1 
-0.112 -0.109 -0.053 -0.078  more than 
14,000km  -5.7 -3.0 -0.7 -1.3 
-0.025 -0.012 -0.004 0.003  log Y/L  -0.9 -0.5 -0.1 0.1 
0.093 0.113 0.091 0.098  landlocked  1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 
sample size  23,149 30,116 33,623 35,955 
HS codes  3,541 4,479 4,917 4,854 
p-values for instrument validity tests 
exogeneous?  0.75 0.89 0.68 0.84 
weak?  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
Notes to Table 5 Maximum likelihood estimation of equation (15) in the text for all exporters 
except Mexico and Canada.  Coefficients are marginal effects, evaluated at sample mean.  
Robust t-statistics clustered by exporting country in italics.  Dependent variable is aic = 1 if 
product i is shipped by air from exporter c.  Log value/kilo is endogenous, instrument is log of 
average value/kilo by HS10 from Canada and Mexico. Y/L is aggregate real GDP per worker of 
the exporter, landlocked is an indicator for the exporter having no port. p-values are the results of 

2 tests for valid instruments.  The “exogenous?” row tests the null that the instrument can be 
excluded from the second stage, while the “weak?” row tests the null that the instrument has no 
marginal explanatory power in the first stage.  
 